How do EU lawmakers vote, and why do some Romanians oppose the Republic of Moldova?
The European Parliament held on Wednesday, June 18, a plenary session where it voted on a resolution prepared by Estonian socialist MEP Sven Mikser. This resolution commends Chisinau for its progress toward European Union membership, as outlined in the European Commission's reports from 2023 and 2024. The final resolution, adopted with overwhelming support from the attending deputies, recognizes the Republic of Moldova in a manner that is rarely seen for a candidate country. This positive text signals the anticipated beginning of accession negotiations.
As is often the case, various amendments were proposed by parties or MEPs to be included in the final text. Some were accepted, while others were rejected. One noteworthy amendment introduced by far-right French MEP Sarah Knafo (amendment 5) stated: [The European Parliament] opposes Moldova’s accession to the EU.” This amendment was rejected by a large majority: 517 votes against, 99 in favor, and only 24 abstentions.
Interestingly, among the 24 who abstained—indicating their opposition to Moldova's EU accession, even if they did not formally vote against it—were Romanian deputies not affiliated with any European party. Diana Șoșoacă and her colleague Luis Lazarus, who were not accepted by any political group, both abstained from voting on the amendment that aimed to have the European Parliament oppose Moldova's EU accession.
How do you vote in the EU Parliament, and what are the alliances and unrecognized enmities that exist even among anti-European parties?
Among those who abstained from voting on Knafo's proposed amendment were notable personalities from France, including Nadine Morano, a prominent MEP from the European People's Party (EPP), which is the main pro-European party.
Additionally, it is no surprise to find recognizable names among the 99 MEPs who openly opposed the amendment. This group included Marion Maréchal, the granddaughter of Marine Le Pen, head of the French far right and a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which also includes Romanian members of the AUR party. The opposition came from various anti-European parties, including many MEPs from Poland, Italy, Scandinavia, and Flemish nationalists.
Notably, among the 99 MEPs who voted against Moldova's admission to the EU (in favor of the rejected amendment) were four members from the main European transnational political group, the Christian Democrats (PPE): François-Xavier Bellamy, Laurent Castillo, Christophe Gomart, and Céline Imart.
The members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who voted for the amendment to reject the Republic of Moldova are divided among three extremist or anti-European parties, which together represent nearly 200 of the 720 MEPs.
Several important lessons can be drawn from this situation. First, the fact that 200 right-wing extremists out of 720 MEPs cannot form a blocking minority on any proposed legislation is significant. In this case, even less than half of these 200 MEPs opposed the future admission of the Republic of Moldova. This demonstrates that fears, which prevailed last year before the European elections in May 2024, regarding a potential internal dislocation of Europe due to extremist factions are unfounded.
While radical right-wing parties have succeeded in defeating their center-right rivals in countries like the Netherlands—where Geert Wilders’ “Party for Freedom” managed to influence the government from the shadows before backing out—and Italy, where Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia leads a dominant right-wing coalition alongside Matteo Salvini’s Lega, the dynamics are different in the European Parliament. In the Parliament, Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and Salvini’s Lega operate in entirely separate political groupings. For instance, Fratelli d’Italia is pro-NATO and anti-Putin, while the Lega takes positions that are the complete opposite.
The concern that extremist parties, often labeling themselves as "sovereignists," could unite at the European level is therefore greatly exaggerated. Although ideologues close to Donald Trump, like Steve Bannon, and Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán have attempted to facilitate the formation of a "transnational" sovereignist group—contradictory by nature, as it represents an "international of ultranationalists"—the reality is far less alarming.
In the European Parliament, these extremist and sovereignist parties are divided into three transnational groups that struggle to work together. For example, the "Patriots for Europe," the third-largest group in the Parliament, refused to accept six Romanian members from the AUR party, influenced by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party from Hungary. The six Romanians then joined the smaller "sovereignist" group, the ECR (Europe of Conservatives and Reformists), but only three out of the six remained after half of them—Claudiu Târziu, Cristian Terheș, and Șerban Sturdza—left the AUR group.
If these six Romanians from AUR cannot reach a consensus and have gone in different directions—additionally, distancing themselves from Diana Șoșoacă—we should be skeptical about the prospect of a cohesive alliance of extremists at the European level.
Taking all of this into account, Șoșoacă and her associate, Lazarus, simply abstained from the vote on Moldova. Thus, Chișinău’s future accession will not hinge on an exaggerated opposition from extremists in the European Parliament or some French Christian Democrats, but instead will depend solely on the progress of the accession negotiations. It is important to remember that one of the Parliament’s key roles is to vote on and approve new admissions. If the Parliament votes "NO," then the agreement of the 27 governments is rendered irrelevant, and vice versa.
What has transpired regarding the resolution on the Republic of Moldova illustrates that previous fears were, in fact, overblown.
