EU extends Russia sanctions, faces internal energy rift
On Monday, June 30, EU countries extended trade sanctions against Russia for another six months, while also preparing to grant financial relief to Slovakia for additional measures.
These trade sanctions, which include approximately 140 billion euros annually in import and export bans and 210 billion euros in blocked central bank assets, were unanimously prolonged by a decision of the EU Council until January 31, 2026.
Currently, 15% of the oil reaching the EU is Russian, indirectly funding the war in Ukraine. While the percentage of Russian hydrocarbons in Europe was 45% to 50% before the invasion of Ukraine, 15% still represents a significant sixth of the total, primarily benefiting Hungary and Slovakia.
It's no secret that the primary obstacles to a complete cessation of Russian hydrocarbon imports are these two Eastern European countries – former communist states with pro-Russian leanings – Hungary and Slovakia. Both benefit from an opt-out clause from the full application of sanctions, and it's true that, before the war in Ukraine, Slovakia was almost entirely dependent on Russian oil and gas.
In fact, it's almost remarkable that unanimity was achieved in extending sanctions against Russia for six months, until January 2026. This is especially true given that Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico had previously refused to sign the sanctions package, which required the unanimous consent of all 27 EU countries, as he sought concessions.
Bratislava sought three concessions: first, guarantees that Slovak companies would not face legal action for breaching contracts with Russian firms; second, compensation for lost transit fees; and third, a promise that no future sanctions plan would be approved by the other 26 member states without Slovakia's full support (though Fico also had the tacit backing of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán here).
Some experts even claim that EU imports from Russia could reach 18% of Europe's needs, at least until August – a figure slightly higher than total LNG imports from the US. This would still make Russia Europe's second-largest supplier, after Norway.
It should be noted, however, that as of now, US President Donald Trump has refrained from doing the same and targeting Moscow with sanctions, even though he has threatened to do so on numerous occasions.
Sanctions imposed by Washington could also persuade some EU countries, such as Hungary—led by Viktor Orbán, who is both an ally of Trump and a friend and admirer of Putin—to accept even tougher measures against Russia, despite expressed concerns about their effectiveness.
EU diplomats familiar with the matter note that one specific point would require American consent: reducing the G7 price cap on Russian oil to $45. This cap has remained at $60 for years, even when oil prices have traded below that level.
The EU's 17th legislative package, adopted on May 20, blacklists several individuals and targets Russia's "shadow fleet." Regarding the latter, the EU has identified over 300 vessels that the bloc believes Moscow uses to circumvent sanctions, particularly for oil exports.
Given that an estimated 600 vessels are part of this fleet, the objective of future measures is to add as many as possible, even though European diplomats acknowledge it's difficult to find evidence that would stand up in court and prove the Kremlin is financing these ships.
There is also the idea of removing over 20 more Russian banks from the international SWIFT payment system, even though most of the country's major banks have already been targeted.
Translation by Iurie Tataru
