Moldova: Russian propaganda network exposed in undercover investigation

A network coordinated from Moscow by the convicted criminal Ilan Șor continued its activities even after last autumn's presidential election, with the goal of paving the way to seize power in the parliamentary elections on September 28.
According to a new undercover investigation by Ziarul de Gardă (ZdG), hundreds of fake accounts, run by real activists from the "Victory" Bloc, were created to spread Russian propaganda on TikTok and Facebook.
Training from Russian curators
ZdG reveals that hundreds of fake TikTok and Facebook accounts are controlled by real "Victory" Bloc activists. For months on end, these activists were trained by curators from the Russian Federation via secret Telegram groups and channels. Each post is carefully monitored, and communication follows strict rules. The investigation found that the network expanded its activities after the 2024 presidential election. Daily training sessions were held on how to create fake accounts, hide identities, use VPNs, and manipulate social media algorithms.
Coordinated propaganda
The individuals in charge, who posted messages under names like Asea Albertovna or Eva Sergheevna, explained to the activists—including the undercover ZdG reporter—that the fight was no longer on the streets but in the information space. The target audience was the elderly, and the main weapon was fear. "Public attention can be captured in two ways. The first is money, the second is fear. We play on people's fears," participants were told.
In December 2024, the focus shifted to TikTok through coordinated online flash mobs. Activists filmed themselves dancing near Christmas trees with messages like "gas for one leu," "LGBT ban," or "pension raises," and they became "models" for hundreds of accounts that were supposed to replicate the same clips. The ten accounts with the most views were awarded iPhones.
The "InfoLeader" Project and the "Personalized Bot Farm"
In 2025, the "InfoLeader" project was launched, where activists, now called "infoleaders," were required to constantly post political content: anti-EU, anti-USAID, and pro-Trump messages, or content against Maia Sandu and Mayor Ion Ceban.
The coordinators admitted that the ultimate goal was to create a "personalized bot farm"—fake accounts that appear real, each with personal posts and entertainment content to avoid being detected as acting in a coordinated manner.
"The work is paid directly from Moscow"
The investigation shows that while it was initially presented as volunteer work, the activists were later compensated. One of the curators, Adam, admitted that the money came from Moscow: "It's paid directly from Moscow." Payments were to be made through accounts at the Russian bank Promsvyazbank, and in some cases, even via cryptocurrency.
Targeted campaigns
Among the tasks documented by ZdG were: supporting Anna Mihalachi in a conflict with President Maia Sandu; campaigns against Mayor Ion Ceban; messages in support of Călin Georgescu, a Romanian politician with sovereigntist sympathies; exploiting the "Katyusha" scandal to accuse the government of "censorship"; and promoting Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and J.D. Vance under the label of "realpolitik" versus "globalists."
The "Victory" Bloc's response
When asked by ZdG about these practices, the leaders of the "Victory" Bloc either refused to answer or evaded the issue.
Translation by Iurie Tataru