ANALYSIS | Electoral disinformation must be tackled through a long-term strategy, not only during election campaigns
Experts emphasize that the Republic of Moldova requires a sustainable and cohesive strategy to effectively combat electoral disinformation, stating that manipulation of information continues even after the polls close. An analytical note published by the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) reveals that attacks on the information landscape are ongoing and becoming increasingly sophisticated. To safeguard the democratic process and maintain citizens' trust, collaboration among the state, public institutions, and online platforms must improve.
"Disinformation does not just vanish after elections; it represents a continual state of vulnerability for democracy. This situation demands a systematic and coordinated response from institutions, social media platforms, and civil society," argue Cătălina Dumbrăveanu and Natalia Șeremet in their analytical research “Electoral disinformation in the digital space: Measures to protect electoral integrity."
The analysis reveals that during the electoral period, the Moldovan digital landscape was overwhelmed by coordinated manipulation campaigns, primarily on TikTok, Telegram, and Facebook. In just a few weeks, over 10,000 politically themed videos were posted on TikTok, generating more than 90 million views—figures that surpass the audiences of national television.
“These huge volumes of false or manipulative content do not appear spontaneously. They indicate a very well-funded and coordinated propaganda infrastructure, which acts in concert to influence voters’ perceptions,” say the authors of the research.
The analytical research identifies several systemic vulnerabilities: the lack of a legislative framework adapted to digital realities, the delayed reaction of public institutions, the reduced cooperation with online platforms and the fragmentation of civil society efforts. Although there were specific actions during the campaign, such as blocking some pages, sanctions applied by electoral authorities or public warnings, these were insufficient.
“The state reacts only when the problem has already gone viral, instead of preventing it. In the absence of a permanent and professional monitoring mechanism, we will continue to lose the fight against disinformation before it is recognized,” warns the cited source.
To protect the integrity of the electoral process, the authors of the analytical research recommend adopting a consolidated legislative framework, which would clearly define the responsibilities of digital platforms and introduce strict transparency rules for online political advertising, as well as creating a national center for monitoring and responding to disinformation, capable of collaborating with European partners and intervening rapidly in times of information crisis.
Media education is also considered an investment in civic resilience: “We cannot stop all sources of disinformation, but we can build the resilience of citizens. Media literacy must become a mandatory component of civic education and a constant exercise in public institutions, newsrooms and local communities”.
The document also notes the importance of proactive public communication campaigns, the so-called “prebunking”, which would explain the mechanisms of manipulation in advance and dismantle false narratives before they go viral. Also, the authors call for public-private and international partnerships, involving government institutions, digital platforms, NGOs and universities, to ensure a coordinated and efficient response.
“Democracy needs infrastructure, just like the economy. If we do not invest in protecting the information space, we lose trust, and without trust there is no free and fair vote”, conclude the authors of the analytical research “Electoral disinformation in the digital space. Measures to protect electoral integrity”.
The parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025 were marked by a large-scale disinformation campaign. According to authorities and independent investigations, the Russian Federation invested hundreds of millions of euros in hybrid operations aimed at seizing power in Chisinau and hindering the European path of the Republic of Moldova.
TikTok, Telegram, Facebook and X were the main channels through which falsehoods about alleged electoral fraud, attacks on Maia Sandu and anti-EU messages were spread.
Also, the Central Electoral Commission imposed sanctions on electoral competitors who used online platforms for promotion without reporting expenses. The Constitutional Court, which validated the election results on October 16, issued an address to Parliament, asking the legislative authority to strengthen the authorities' powers in regulating online platforms and to establish practical measures to protect the information space during electoral periods, while respecting freedom of expression.
